I gather the bug allows people you've explicitly authorized to ssh into some account on your machine, to access more than that account can. So if you only use ssh yourself, or only give ssh keys for users with sudo, or only to people you trust not to exploit this, or if other vulnerabilities allow local shell users to escalate, or if you only use tailscale for port forwarding, then you're unaffected. Arguably even less exposed than a public openssh instance, though I can't say I have any issue doing that
Of course it is, if you rely on that boundary. The 'consumer' use of tailscale is just as a reverse proxy, and that's how I figured GGP sees it. I don't have anyone on my tailnet, and when I did they didn't have ssh keys, and if they did I imagine there'd be many paths to privilege escalation, certainly it's a bigger surface than sshd. So I was clarifying it seems like an escalation from authorized execution to privileged execution, and not e.g. from unauthorized users to RCE
