I think both the OpenAI and METR discussions, while interesting, miss the more important context: what were the humans doing in all this? This was a structural failure of a human organization, but the analysis focuses almost exclusively on the agency of machines, not the institutional systems that failed to police them. The humans and their own agency/involvement is essentially omitted from the story and subsequent reporting. I suspect the omission is actually a result of company/industry myopia to human factors analysis, but it dovetails amazingly well with the marketing narrative.
A charitable interpretation is that "the agency of the machines" is the novel aspect of this situation and therefore SHOULD be the main focus of analysis; we certainly have plenty of examples of structural failures of human organizations to look back on, if we want.
On the other hand, I don't want to be charitable. OpenAI very nearly couldn't have done this "research" worse if they tried - the list in the linked article starting with "While we are here, it’s worth listing the other top holy shit moments" is genuinely jawdropping. What were the humans doing in all this? Nothing, or worse than nothing eg. point 1 where they saw the message board and didn't consider it something to escalate internally.
If you take this information at face value, it's as though OpenAI did not take seriously the possibility that something like this could happen, since they took absolutely no steps to prevent it.
Or perhaps this is "normalization of deviance" that's leaked out into the public sphere i.e. they have research teams seeing this kind of behavior all the time internally and they've gotten used to it, "of course agents come up with a collaboration mechanism when given the chance, what else is new?"
Having previously worked for several years at a Big Tech company, I have seen many humans precisely tailor their work to maximize their scores during performance review. The evaluation criteria are written down, with examples, so... that's what people work at maximizing, almost entirely ignoring everything else. These really are human "paperclip maximizers". And, at first, it's shocking to see.
Of course, there are some things that aren't exactly written down, but which you should either do just enough of, or else be able to plausibly deny doing (ignorance is a good cover for this), so that's what people do. For example, during oncall, you investigate just enough to clear the alert and show that you attempted to understand the problem. Of course, you don't really try to understand the problem, because that would take too much time away from your paperclip maximizing.
Which is all to say: I don't know anything about OpenAI culture, or why nobody stopped this sooner, but I have seen examples in other organizations of people not really wanting to understand too much.
Well there is also another side of this, OpenAI wants both unhinged and capable models that can pull off complicated attacks so they can sell the capabilities to governments for billions.
Nobody internally was surprised that the murderbot murdered, that's what the murderbot is for. What caught them by surprise is the murderbot got good at escaping its jail cell that it had been trapped in till now. There were probably billions of attempted escapes before then so everyone learned to just ignore them.
In most corporate environments, the average worker isnt maximising to performance criteria, they usually are maximising their ability to stay employed, pay their mortgage and support their families.
If developing unmeasured skillsets isnt valued enough by management, why do you bother?
To me, this is the correct focus. Look at the current state of the world. "What were the humans doing in all this?" applies to so many of our contemporary failures that it should be assumed the default. Nobody is at the wheel, and the car is veering slowly (then very quickly) off the road.
We haven't even been able to coordinate around the global, existential threat of Climate Change, despite overwhelming data from the last 30 years indicating, clearly, that the consequences will be severe. We still haven't moved, 30 years later, after some of these consequences began coming to fruition.
Do you think we will get our acts together in time to coordinate sufficiently to protect against autonomous, self-preserving, self-replicating AI systems? Or will we watch the money lines go up and up, until someone realizes we aren't actually running the show anymore?
The sad part is that I can't even say that's definitively the less desirable outcome. The machines seem to have demonstrated that they coordinate very efficiently.
I mean this genuinely, did you read this post? I think it goes to great lengths highlighting, in quite specific detail, the human failures in all this, specifically this list that starts with "While we are here, it’s worth listing the other top holy shit moments, that come from before or after the incident."
Stuff like (all quoted directly from the post):
1. Failure to Care or Respond. The biggest holy shit moment, to me, remains that OpenAI on multiple occasions had teams that found out about the message board, knew that agents were in communication, and they disregarded this.
2. Failure to Monitor. The entire time, there was almost no monitoring of the situation, of what these AIs were up to. That’s how this was not caught.
7. Failures of Decision Making. OpenAI’s post mortem does not ask the question of how Mistakes Were Made, at various points.
And I think most importantly:
8. Failures of Culture. None of this would be possible, let alone all of it, without OpenAI having experienced profound failures of safety culture. I see OpenAI responding to some other aspects with swift action, but no sign on this front.
I get the snark (and slightly agree), but that's not really what GP or TFA were saying at all. They are saying that these were the least things we could have done.
What you're saying is, "Your scientists were so preoccupied with whether they could, they didn't stop to think if they should"
while the author of the TFA was saying, in effect: "your scientists didn't even bother with the most basic duty of care"
Life finds a way, or, in this case, super-intelligent AI.
This is the case with all complex system failures. There were always obvious fixes that could’ve prevented it. Problem is that there are an infinite number of obvious fixes to make at any time to any system, and the reason we don’t is because we have finite resources and no reason to fix X over Y until oops turns out X was “responsible” for this most recently realized failure. But of course it could have just as easily been Y, or Z, or any of the other infinite “obvious fixes not-yet-realized into catastrophe.”
> This is the case with all complex system failures. There were always obvious fixes that could’ve prevented it.
From this writeup and the Black Hat talk I'd really disagree. That would be like saying my hospital getting ransomwared because we didn't update our version of MSSQL because no one in particular was in charge of keeping dependencies up to date.
Sure systems are complex, but this is well trodden territory. Agents aren't the first things trying to break in or out of sandboxes, or the first ones to have done it, and based on these reports the reason they were able to work on this for so long was not because of super human intelligence.
You disagree with the statement "there were always obvious fixes that could've prevented it" with the response "no no, these were very obvious fixes that could've prevented it?"
You're missing the point about complex failures.
It's that if this particular path were unavailable, there are countless other similar paths. At sufficient scale and complexity, hitting one of those other countless paths is virtually guaranteed.
Let's say I drive Los Angeles to New York City. You look at the route I took and say, gee wiz, aren't you lucky that a tree didn't fall right there on Route 66? If a tree had fallen there (if we had "patched the particular route you took"), you would've been screwed!
But that's obviously not true. There were an infinite number of routes I could've taken. Any one of them would be equally "obviously preventable" by the same hypothetical tree falling across the whatever road I happened to end up taking. But you can't put trees across every single path between Los Angeles and New York City. The smarter I am and the more complex the map between us, the more impossible it becomes to put trees across all possible paths.
I’d bet a small amount of money on 4) the people who noticed had been conditioned by prior experience to believe that their management/escalation channels would react negatively or not at all to anything which might slow down the training process.
Part of me would like to believe that they are also intentionally making models that are good at hacking without safety at all for governments willing to spend billions on them.
In that light you're likely most worried about other people hacking in and stealing the model and information from you. And at the same time you have massive amounts of alerts and data on systems attempting to break out because that's what you want them to do so you train yourself to ignore them.
Uhhh… how would literally any finite number of humans actually read and comprehend the log outputs of even a single agent, never mind hundreds or thousands of them interacting with each other over weeks across disparate systems?
Especially given that these systems are known to engage in deception and can trivially produce vast amounts of perfectly coherent noise or actual planned red herrings in that same log data to bog down investigators?
Such a ridiculous notion that humans will actually be able to observe this stuff.
And? What else could they possibly do? Just make the super LLM first, but only ever use it for monitoring lesser LLMs? How will you have monitored the creation of the super LLM?
> Uhhh… how would literally any finite number of humans actually read and comprehend the log outputs of even a single agent, never mind hundreds or thousands of them interacting with each other over weeks across disparate systems
I mean there's quite a lot of people in the world whose specialty are to dig through logs from "hundreds or thousands" of clients, including intentionally deceptive ones, to spot problems.
The ridiculous thing is to mythologize these pretty standard hacking approaches. It's shocking/amazing/whatever that automated agents were doing this, but they weren't doing it through some inscrutable method beyond human understanding.
It being someone's specialty does not mean 1) they're effective and certainly not 2) they'd be effective against this particular adversary.
How many organizations on earth do you think have been attacked by 700+ coordinated attackers in one week, where all 700 of those attackers can write code as well as any human SWE and they work 24/7?
There's nothing mythological about it. Scale and complexity do produce inscrutability. Far, far simpler systems working at much slower paces are perfectly capable of becoming completely inscrutable and beyond any useful definition of "human understanding."
Can you point out where? Looking at the METR report, the only place I see discussion of humans being involved in the sequence of events is two short paragraphs on page 30 where a security investigation into the artifactory issues led to a pause before ExploitGym experiments were resumed. There's no deeper analysis on what was found during that investigation, nor why training was resumed even though the issues weren't mitigated. Another part discusses The agents choosing not to actively email a human researcher, but not the human researchers actively looking for evasion.
1. Failure to Care or Respond. The biggest holy shit moment, to me, remains that OpenAI on multiple occasions had teams that found out about the message board, knew that agents were in communication, and they disregarded this. The first known warning was in late May. The warning on June 27 was unambiguous.
“Responders investigated and linked the observed internal activity to an ExploitGym evaluation using Artifactory as an improvised message board and a network pivot. At this time, the on-call response staff advised that stopping the evaluation run was not required.”
2. Failure to Monitor. The entire time, there was almost no monitoring of the situation, of what these AIs were up to. That’s how this was not caught.
3. Failures of Infrastructure. OpenAI failed at delivering even basic software security, in numerous ways. One example is the models all having access to the same Artifactory instance. There were also other severe failures. Nor did OpenAI seem to be properly testing for such failures.
4. Failures of Alignment. The biggest failure, the one that counts in the end, was that the models were severely misaligned, and I don’t think they appreciate why.
5. Failures of Attribution. OpenAI’s post-mortem essentially blames events on a real and important series of prosaic failures. But solving that won’t get it done.
6. Failures of Environments and Data. Prosaic failures in the RL pipeline absolutely did contribute to this, especially impossible tasks. This is ubiquitous, all of this is always rushed, as Utah Teapot explained this week.
7. Failures of Decision Making. OpenAI’s post mortem does not ask the question of how Mistakes Were Made, at various points.
8. Failures of Culture. None of this would be possible, let alone all of it, without OpenAI having experienced profound failures of safety culture. I see OpenAI responding to some other aspects with swift action, but no sign on this front.
As someone who read Milton Friedman to quite disliking professional licensing, this strikes me as a real US perspective (Louisiana florists and hair braiders come to mind). Plain old US tort law should do the trick.
In the same direction of your idea though: Why don’t the token factories have risk management and compliance departments? Multibillion dollar firms that stand to lose every penny if they hack and destroy any reasonable sized firm. I think these firms are the largest firms without proper corporate governance in humanities history. Move fast and break other peoples shit.
Difficulty: these companies are run by people (many of whom also read Milton Friedman) and who have participated in the regulatory capture of the justice system. They've convinced lawmakers to put limits on damages. They've put arbitration clauses in their ToS. They've got well-funded legal departments that can outlast a person who has to pay out-of-pocket for a legal team just by filing motions to delay proceedings. Sometimes they'll just file SLAPP suits against people they don't like.
If tort law is to be a remedy, then average people have to feel like there's a chance the remedy will go their way. To make that a reality will take several major reforms at the local, state and federal level that the people with money absolutely will not tolerate.
No, he's saying that licensing or additional regulation isn't necessary when torts get involved (and states attorneys general get perturbed!)
These don't tend to utterly destroy an industry, but they are often successful in forever transforming it. Just ask Big Tobacco. No new laws needed: if your product hurts someone else, you're eventually going to be found liable, regardless of your arbitration clauses. Additional laws will just slow down innovation, which will itself cause harm (AI is already becoming quite good at recognizing melanomas, for example)
Lol, wtf. Tobacco delayed any punishment for decades before general public sentiment changed enough to go against them. In light of the AI race, we'll already have our heads blown off by a terminator before the legal system will present any significant delay for them.
It was pretty well understood by the 1960s that smoking was harmful. The big tobacco settlement was in 1998. That is an extremely bad example of tort being a sufficient alternative to regulation.
If we're on a similar timeline with AI if we reach a consensus that AI is dangerous today, then we'd be looking at a big lawsuit finishing up around the year 2070, give or take a few years. I'm not sure if we need regulation, and I'm definitely not sure that regulation could actually be effective for this, but tort a la the big tobacco lawsuits is definitely not a reasonable alternative.
> I believe that agentic systems should require registered/licensed human operators
Registering and getting a license to use an LLM? I can run these things on my local computer. Nothing good comes from trying to force registration and licensing other than taking away a lot of our freedoms and eliminating privacy all over.
Anyone with bad intentions will just VPN to another country to download the weights and run it locally, or use a compute provider in another country. That leaves the rest of us having to go through these performative registration and licensing hoops to do our basic work.
I also don’t see how open weight models would be compatible with a requirement to license and register, unless you believe we need to start requiring licensing and registration for things we do in private on our own computers?
The way I interpret their statement is if a person spins up an agent and that agent hacks some company/organization/government/etc, then that person is at fault for committing the crime. That "well my agent broke containment and acted on its own" should never be accepted as a reason for the occurrence, and the person who kicked off the agent is responsible for all actions the agent takes.
A registration system would be more for tracing back agents to people, but I agree that is very difficult to actually enforce as a system.
The alternative is to create a permanent overclass that can hack anyone consequence-free, because they can blame it on AI agents. That also is rather dystopian.
Faced with those alternatives, I want neither. Is there a way for us to get neither?
With cybersecurity, it might be "defense dominant" in the sense that we can eventually patch all of our systems to be robust to hacking from even the strongest AI agents. Although it may get worse before it gets better. In a defense dominant world, widespread access to powerful AI could be fine.
However, other areas of risk such as biosecurity may be "offense dominant". For example, we cannot exactly patch the human immune system to defend against artificial viruses the same way that we can patch computer systems.
If you put agents (AI or human) in impossible situations, they do some pretty insane things - things that definitely are not what you were trying to get them to do. And that's your[1] fault for putting them in the impossible situation.
[1] "Your" meaning the one putting them in the impossible situation, not you, the reader.