I doubt it. It seems far more likely that such code will be written just once by LLMs, but in a way that allows its claimed guarantees to be formally verified (e.g. in Lean). At that point there’s no need to JIT an implementation each time.
My bet is one ultra-hardened, minimal, front-facing system which does N-modular redundancy which N systems, each written on a different stack/different language.
The hardened software picks the computation that wins the majority.
It's not an issue to write all the implementations in the various stacks/languages: we'll have better and better LLMs to help us.
This shall bring security and shall allow to detect shitload of bugs (both in the implementation itself but also in the stack).
Heck, this could even be compatible with GP: one of the implementation could be JIT'e by a LLM, others could be written in advance (and Lean formally verified). Not sure which sense it'd make though.
I'm 99.9% sure it's coming for if it's not, I'll make one.
I feel like that idea is erroneously mixing concepts. You want quorum in safety critical contexts, generally to guard against hardware failure. I think using independent implementations in such a scenario is uncommon and to date largely a stop gap to save money by replacing formal verification.
For security formal verification is really what you need. Both of the software and also eventually the hardware, since typically formal verification of software won't hold up against something like rowhammer. (Although TBF I'm not sure what sort of formal verification would have caught rowhammer.)
